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The relationship between corporate accounting fraud and macroeconomic 
downturns represents an enormous opportunity to better understand the landscape of the 
American market, and yet this remains one of the most under-researched topics in the 
field. While most modern research focuses on the incentives behind the executives 
committing fraud, very little has been done in the way of determining how these actions 
impact greater society both directly and inadvertently in the form of macroeconomic 
aftermath.  
Understanding if and how instances of financial reporting misconduct can be 
used as a predictor of changes in economic conditions could be an invaluable addition 
to the toolbox of future economists. Additionally, creating an effective model that 
predicts the relationship between these variables has the potential to inform consumers 
by helping to explain how the rate of fraud detection can impact the economy. The 
following research explores the relationship between financial reporting misconduct and 
the economy at large.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 This research is all about exploring companies that partake in under-the-table 
deals, collusion, and effectively lying to their entire user base about the quality of their 
product. A single arrangement has the potential to make or break an executive’s career. 
This same arrangement can also simultaneously deceive thousands of unwitting 
individuals in the general public. Millions of dollars are on the line, as the battle 
between what is truthful and what is profitable is waged on one of the most public 
stages in the United States.  
 While this may sound like an excerpt from a high-profile thriller novel, this field 
of study stems from a domain that seems to be on an entirely different wavelength: 
accounting. Here we inspect corporate fraud, where the “product” being delivered to the 
end consumer is the annual financial statements filed with the federal government. 
These documents, prepared and delivered by the fiduciary agents of the company’s 
management, detail the financial happenings of the company over the fiscal year. The 
“consumers” of these products are the real owners of the company, the shareholders, 
who look to these filings for information on how the corporation is performing. The 
conflicting interests of this principal-agent relationship presents a challenging problem: 
while management may not have much “skin in the game” in the company’s ownership, 
there is a reasonable expectation of success from shareholders. Failure to meet these 
expectations may result in negative paygrade or termination. 
When a company’s performance is subpar, upper management may approach the 
consequences in a variety of ways. While the vast majority of these actions are legal and 
in compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, the one percent I will be 
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researching are those that choose to “fudge the numbers” of their financial statements in 
order to mislead shareholders and other stakeholders. This is corporate accounting 
fraud.  
My research examines the relationship between detected accounting fraud and 
future macroeconomic conditions. Intuitively, the detection of fraud results in massive 
monetary losses for a firm’s shareholders, potentially reducing individual consumption 
and harming the economy. Fraud detection may also result in decreased consumer 
confidence in the market, which would also lead to decreased consumption. There may 
even be an impact on unemployment as firm shareholders in the accused corporation 
suffer massive losses and potentially lay off employees. These theoretical processes 
yield the specific question that guided my research: to what extent can the detection of 
accounting fraud help explain changes in future macroeconomic conditions? 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
The purpose of this study was to determine whether or not detected accounting 
fraud can be used to help explain changes in the United States economy, while 
additional cross-sectional analysis helped determine which aspects of a fraud detection 
have the greatest impact on economic conditions. I have chosen to limit my analysis to 
the US to maintain a consistent set of federal regulations regarding fraud detection and 
also to narrow the scope of economic analysis to control for other variables. The 
following methods will be implemented to achieve this goal. 
Definition of Key Terms 
Before gathering data for this research, a clear definition of “financial reporting 
misconduct” had to be established. The problem with researching fraud and other forms 
of misreporting is that its occurrence can be difficult to estimate when only a minute 
fraction of cases are actually discovered. Even then, the intent behind a misstatement 
can be difficult to discern. “Corporate fraud” can even be somewhat misleading, as not 
all misconduct results in litigation, and not all fraud cases that go to trial result in 
convictions. Therefore, the data this research required encompassed misreporting by 
management that results in material misstatement on the financials. The phrases 
“financial reporting misconduct” and “corporate fraud” will be used interchangeably to 
describe this phenomenon. 
Definitions for macroeconomic conditions are more clear-cut. The primary 
measure of a country’s economic success is its annual gross domestic product (GDP), 
which measures the total value of all final goods and services produced within the 
nation’s borders in a given year. The unemployment rate reveals the percentage of 
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unemployed individuals as a percentage of the total workforce. These two measures, 
although in isolation may vastly under-simplify overall economic health, still provided a 
mechanism of interpreting the state of the US economy. These were used as the 
benchmarks for macroeconomic conditions for the sake of my research. 
Data Sources 
Obtaining data from sources that are reputable, reliable, and accurate was a 
critical step to ensuring the success of this research. For data on instances of financial 
reporting misconduct, I used Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). 
These statements are issued by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) following 
an investigation into a company or individual for alleged financial misconduct. The 
dataset I relied on is a comprehensive database of AAER’s dating back to the 1980’s 
that relate to financial reporting misconduct.  
A major problem with research into financial reporting misconduct is that there 
is often a significant delay between the actual occurrence of fraud and the time when it 
is detected. While the AAER data does include the periods over which fraud occurred, 
my research is interested in when the fraud was publicly revealed. I expected that the 
detection and revelation of fraud was more likely to influence consumer behavior and 
subsequently economic conditions because shareholder losses and consumer confidence 
likely do not change until the fraud is revealed. For the purposes of this study, I 
identified the revelation of the fraud as occurring 3 months after the end of the 
misreporting period.  
Using data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), I also 
calculated each firm’s market capitalization before and after the fraud was discovered. 
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The difference between these measures helps describe the loss to investors, as it reflects 
the total value of stock lost over all of the firm’s shares. Although this measure could be 
calculated by hand-collecting the exact date of fraud discovery, for the purposes of this 
research I found it sufficient to calculate each firm’s market capitalization as of the date 
the misreporting began and the market capitalization three months after the end of the 
misreporting period.  
Economic data was obtained from a few sources. The Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis offers an online source FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data) that provides 
a user-friendly database for manipulation of variables and data extraction. The site uses 
reputable government research institutes’ data and compiles it into a database sorted 
into quarterly measurements. Data on unemployment rates was collected by the United 
States Bureau of Labor Statistics (USBLS), and the data I used for GDP was collected 
by the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis (USBEA). I accessed both of these 
data sources through FRED for my analysis. 
I also accessed consumer sentiment data through FRED. This program allowed 
me to download a quarterly measurement of consumer sentiment data collected from the 
Surveys of Consumers research sector of the University of Michigan. Sentiment data 
reflects the attitude of consumers towards the state of the economy. This data is based 
on a baseline score of 100, with higher values reflecting higher consumer sentiment. 
Consumer sentiment measurements help contextualize economic conditions through 
consumer perceptions. 
I organized all of this data by quarters in the calendar year. Each quarter had a 
value for the number of instances of accounting fraud revealed and the corresponding 
 6 
 
change in GDP and unemployment during that period. Unfortunately, different data 
sources had unique cutoffs for the time periods available for their data, and with the 
nature of my analysis I could only use observational periods wherein there was data 
available for all variables. This resulted in a smaller observation pool than would have 
been available from any of the data sources independently. I collected usable data from 
years 1980-2012 for my analysis, and aggregating data quarterly I collected a total of 
130 observable periods. 
Data Analysis and Application  
I used the program Statistical Analysis Software (SAS) in conducting my 
analysis. Given the size and quality of data I retrieved, this software was the most 
practical option for creating concise results reports.   
Before diving into the details of using SAS for this particular model, it’s 
important to understand how linear regression equations are useful for research that 
gauges the strength of relationship between two variables. This relationship, though 
generally descriptive for past observations, are even more useful in that they can allow 
for future prediction of the variables if their relationship is strong enough. Basically, 
this software takes observed data and aggregates it into an equation that can predict 
future values based on past values. The software also automatically calculates statistical 
values that measure the strength of the relationship between variables, which is what I 
used to determine if there is a significant negative relationship between instances of 
accounting fraud and GDP.  
While I didn’t necessarily expect the detection of a singular fraud to result in a 
massive economic downturn, this analysis was aimed at determining if the amount of 
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fraud detection in a given period may slow the growth of GDP in the following period. 
In the form of the simple linear equation Y = x + b1, the Y output I examined was the 
percent change in GDP from the following period. The independent variable was the 
measured instances of corporate accounting fraud for the period, and the remaining 
variables were controls to help capture factors that may be behind any discovered 
changes in GDP. I controlled for GDP in the quarter the fraud was revealed by lagging 
the variable by one period as an additional variable.  
A secondary test examined a similar relationship, but with the change in 
unemployment rate as the dependent variable. This equation attempted to model the 
relationship between detected financial reporting misconduct and a change in the 
unemployment rate.  
I performed additional cross-sectional analysis to determine how different 
characteristics of a fraud detection may influence the severity of its impact on the 
economy. One such characteristic I chose to examine was consumer sentiment. I 
expected that if consumer confidence is already low at the time of the detection, its 
impact will be more severe as consumption is driven down even further.  
Examining this variable required the inclusion of an interaction variable to my 
previous simple linear regression equation. An interaction variable measures how the 
addition of another variable into a model influences the relation between the dependent 
variable and an explanatory variable in the model. This shows both how the variable 
itself impacts the equation and also explains how well the two variables interact with 
                                                        
1In this equation and the ones following, I have simplified the regression equation for ease of reading for 
individuals unfamiliar with stats analysis. This simplified equation does not include controls in the model 
nor the residual term.  
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each other in the scope of the entire model. This additional variable changed my model 
equation to Y = x1 + x2 + (x1* x2) + b. The variable x2 is the second factor, and the 
component (x1* x2) shows how the variables interact when combined. If the interaction 
term in this model is statistically significant, this suggests that the pre-existing 
sentiment of consumer confidence may help predict just how much a detected fraud will 
impact the economy. 
I tested an additional variable in this cross-sectional analysis: the size of the loss 
shareholders experienced due to the fraud. I used the change in the company’s market 
capitalization from before versus after the detection, and if this change surpassed a 
threshold to be considered a “big” loss, an additional interaction variable was added into 
the equation. I defined this threshold as the median value of loss market capitalization 
for fraud firms, and any observation greater than this median was classified as a big 
fraud. Theoretically, the size of the loss may directly and indirectly impact the effect of 
the detection on GDP or unemployment. The direct impact is seen most obviously in 
direct loss to shareholders and company employees, while more indirect effects may 
linger over time in the form of lost consumer confidence and related-industry losses.  
The treatment of this variable is different from consumer sentiment because the 
existence of a big loss is dependent on a fraud being detected in the first place. Instead 
of adding in a second factor, this equation only added the interaction component to the 
otherwise simple linear regression. The resulting equation took the form Y = x1 + (x1* 
x2), where the interaction variable showed how the existence of a massive loss impacts 
the detection’s effect on GDP or unemployment. 
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While the intricacies of the model and the analysis may make this research 
appear complicated, these equations served to answer a few simple questions for my 
research. First, does fraud detection have a significant effect on economic conditions? 
Next, how does pre-existing sentiment effect the severity of a detection’s impact on 
economic conditions? Lastly, does a massive loss from fraud detection impact economic 
conditions differently than smaller losses? The statistical research I performed through 
SAS helped provide some clarity to these questions.  
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
Precise language is integral to the field of accounting, as incorrectly defining 
terms like “fraud” and “material misstatement” can dramatically impact the data 
collected for research. Amiram, et al.’s “Financial Reporting Fraud and Other Forms of 
Misconduct: A Multidisciplinary Review of the Literature” (2017) provides a broad 
basis for these definitions and guides language of the field to a more precise consensus. 
The work covers far more content than will be explored in this thesis and is generally a 
foundational reiteration of existing concepts rather than a source for innovation. 
However, the fifth and final segment of the article entitled “Direction for future research 
on financial reporting misconduct” poses ten opportunities for future exploration in the 
field. One of these questions concerns the relation between macroeconomic conditions 
and financial reporting misconduct, the focus of my research. They claim that the 
central question of my research has yet to be answered in published works, and argue 
that if this model can be created, it could provide an avenue for economists to 
accomplish the tricky task of predicting downturns in real time (Amiram, et al. 2017).  
Amiram, et al. cite “Booms, busts, and fraud” (2007) by Povel, Sing, and 
Winton as the flagship research into the relationship between financial reporting 
misconduct and macroeconomic conditions. In this theoretical work, Povel, et al. focus 
on incentives of both financial statement consumers and upper management. Consumers 
are incentivized to review financial statements more scrupulously during less 
prosperous times because the success of the company they choose to invest in is more 
crucial to their overall financial health. As conditions improve, however, consumers 
check the financials with less intensity because they assume that if the company and 
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industry have been profitable in the past they will continue to do so in the future. While 
consumer’s intensity of reviewing financial statements decreases, managers’ risks of 
being caught for fraudulent misstatements decreases. They are thereby incentivized to 
commit fraud to better the appearance of their performance, especially as an economic 
peak hits and slowly begins to decline (Povel, et al. 2007). This research helps illustrate 
a potential positive relationship between economic conditions and the occurrence of 
financial reporting misconduct. In contrast, my analysis serves to examine whether the 
revelation of fraud helps explain future economic conditions.  
In his 2004 work “Managerial Incentives, Misreporting, and the Timing of 
Social Learning: A Theory of Slow Booms and Rapid Recessions,” Hertzberg explores 
the same relationship as the study above but focuses on different incentives of 
managers. He focuses on short-term versus long-term incentives of managers and 
theorizes that during times of economic prosperity, managers are more likely to 
manipulate profits to cover up weak performance if they are incentivized for their short-
term performance. This delays the release of information about the true state of the 
economy to consumers, as they remain unaware of disparities between a company’s 
actual performance and that which is publicized. Conversely, during a downturn, 
managers’ actions are guided by long-term incentives, making them less likely to 
commit fraud in the present. This provides immediate information delivery to 
consumers (Hertzberg 2004). The combination of this work and that of Povel, et al. 
suggests that there could be correlation between economic conditions and financial 
reporting misconduct. 
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A member of the Povel, et al. study, Winton, also researched on another crucial 
work’s team. The 2010 work of Wang, Winton, and Yu entitled “Corporate fraud and 
business conditions: Evidence from IPOs” explores a similar relationship to that of 
Povel, et al., while focusing exclusively on initial public offerings (IPOs). An IPO is a 
company’s first offering of shares of their company to individuals outside of the 
organization. The success of this initial sale can be a primary indicator of the 
company’s success and growth into the future and can be an especially important 
measure to venture capitalists who may wish to invest in the firm. Therefore, the IPO of 
any company is a prime time for managers to exaggerate earnings, and this research 
indicated that this becomes even more likely when investors perceive the economy as 
growing (Wang, et al. 2010). With that said, this study does not examine the impact that 
these frauds have on the economy.  
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Chapter 4: Results and Analysis 
Descriptive Statistics 
The purpose of running descriptive statistics prior to proceeding to regression 
analysis is to ensure there are no major outlying values or any other issues with the data 
that would interfere with accurate analysis. I conducted a basic descriptive statistics 
analysis of the data to safeguard against these issues. 
Table 1       
Parameter N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 
Unemploymentt 130 6.502 1.711 3.947 6.004 10.906 
% Change Unemploymentt 129 0.001 0.047 -0.094 -0.009 0.167 
Count of Frauds in Quartert 130 6.938 5.158 0 6 26 
Consumer Sentimentt 130 86.212 12.893 54.4 90.6 110.1 
$ Change GDPt 129 103.585 72.373 -275.6 102.128 271.617 
% Change GDPt 129 0.013 0.008 -0.019 0.013 0.044 
Count of Big Fraudst 129 2.115 2.71 0 1 14 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics, SAS output 
This table summarizes the SAS output for descriptive statistics of variables used in this 
analysis. See Appendix A for full SAS report.  
 
The above statistics suggested that the variables listed would be acceptable to proceed 
with further regression analysis. 
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Main Regressions 
GDP as a Function of Counted Frauds 
My first analysis constituted a simple regression of the change in United States 
GDP against the number of frauds revealed during the prior quarter. SAS analysis 
showed the following statistical relation between the variables. 
Table 2              
 $ Change GDPt  
Parameter Estimate t Stat. 
Intercept 50.1222145 3.54 
Count of Frauds in Quartert-1 0.0061996 .01 
$ Change GDPt-1 0.5240902 6.81 
Adj. R2 .2667 -  
N 128 -  
Table 2: GDP as a function of counted frauds, SAS output. 
This table summarizes the SAS output for the listed variables, including an estimate for 
each and their associated t-values at 127 degrees of freedom. $ Change GDP in $ 
billions. See Appendix B for full SAS report.  
In analyzing the results of the SAS output, I considered a t-stat greater than 1.96 
statistically significant for the purposes of my research. As shown above, the count of 
frauds did not prove to be a statistically significant predictor of the dollar change in 
GDP. To further hone in on the accuracy of fraud count as a predictor of GDP, I also 
computed a SAS report for the number of frauds as a predictor of the percent increase in 
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GDP. These results depict how the number of frauds could potentially slow the growth 
of GDP. 
Table 3              
 % Change GDPt  
Parameter Estimate t Stat. 
Intercept 0.0074299 4.16 
Count of Frauds in Quartert-1 -0.0001128 -0.94 
% Change GDPt-1 0.5126964 4.46 
Adj. R2 .2589 -  
N 128 -  
Table 3: Percent change in GDP as a function of counted frauds, SAS output. 
This table summarizes the SAS output for 127 degrees of freedom. See Appendix C for 
full SAS report.  
This alternative application of the same GDP data reveals a negative association 
between the number of frauds and the growth of GDP, which aligns with my 
expectations of the market following discovered financial reporting misconduct. 
However, this correlation is not statistically significant. 
Unemployment as a Function of Counted Frauds 
This regression analysis followed a similar format to that described above for 
GDP, except with the national unemployment rate and the change in unemployment rate 
used as the dependent variables for each separate test. Once again, the a lead-lag design 
was used, with the dependent variable being measured in quarter t and the independent 
variable of interest being measure in quarter t-1.  
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Table 4              
 Unemploymentt  
Parameter Estimate t Stat. 
Intercept 0.216093 1.28 
Count of Frauds in Quartert-1 -0.0065056 -0.87 
Unemploymentt-1 0.9759715 43.77 
Adj. R2 .9608 -  
N 129 -  
Table 4: Unemployment as a function of count of frauds, SAS output. 
This table summarizes the SAS output for 128 degrees of freedom. See Appendix D for 
full SAS report.  
As the estimated coefficient on count of frauds is statistically insignificant, this 
suggests that the number of frauds in a quarter does not help explain a change in 
unemployment in the following quarter. I also ran this data using the percent change in 
unemployment, as shown below. 
Table 5              
 % Change Unemploymentt  
Parameter Estimate t Stat. 
Intercept -0.0017637 -0.31 
Count of Frauds in Quartert-1 0.00014 0.19 
% Change Unemploymentt-1 0.6140813 7.79 
Adj. R2 .3955 -  
N 128 -  
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Table 5: Change in unemployment as a function of count of frauds, SAS output.  
This table summarizes the SAS output for 128 degrees of freedom. See Appendix E for 
full SAS report.  
Although still statistically insignificant, this specification showed a positive 
correlation between the number of frauds detected in a quarter and the unemployment 
rate.  
Cross-Sectional Analysis 
Consumer Sentiment 
This additional variable depicts the effect of pre-existing consumer sentiment on 
unemployment and GDP.  “Bad” consumer sentiment was identified for all observations 
below the median over the relevant quarters; these observations were used as a dummy 
variable in this analysis. While this variable did not prove statistically significant in 
predicting any dependent variable, the results are worth noting below. 
 
Table 6     
 $ Change GDPt  % Change GDPt  
 Estimate t Stat.  Estimate t Stat. 
Count of Fraudst-1 .4626945 0.28 -0.0002372 -1.38 
Bad Sentiment Dummy 4.0817342 .22 -0.0021954 -0.89 
Frauds t-1 * Bad Sentiment -0.6735495 -0.31 0.000164 0.72 
$ Change GDPt-1 0.5192099 6.34        -        - 
% Change GDPt-1 -  -  0.12700396 3.9 
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Adj. R2 .2553 -  .2526 -  
N 128 -  128  
Table 6: Cross-sectional analysis of GDP and GDP growth as a function of count of 
frauds with consumer sentiment dummy variable, SAS output. 
This table summarizes the separate SAS outputs for dependent variables $ Change GDP 
and % Change GDP, respectively. Both are measured as a function of number of frauds 
with a consumer sentiment dummy variable for 127 degrees of freedom. See 
Appendices F and G for full SAS reports.  
As demonstrated above through the use of a dummy variable, pre-existing negative 
consumer sentiment does not have a statistically significant impact on predicting GDP 
or GDP growth. It also does not influence the relation between revealed frauds and 
GDP.  
I also analyzed the cross-sectional effect of consumer sentiment as a predictor of 
unemployment. 
Table 7      
 Unemploymentt  % Change Unemploymentt 
 Estimate t Stat. Estimate t Stat.  
Count of Fraudst-1 -0.0005986 1.78 0.00108871 0.67 
Bad Sentiment 
Dummy 
0.3865785 -0.11 0.01164346 1.17 
Fraudst-1 * Bad 
Sentiment 
-0.0106047 3.92 0.00147439 -0.48 
Unemploymentt-1 0.936625 -1.09        -        - 
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% Change 
Unemploymentt-1 
-  -  0.08019134 7.19 
Adj. R2 .9673 -  .3945  
N 129 -  128  
Table 7: Cross-sectional analysis of unemployment and change unemployment as a 
function of count of frauds with consumer sentiment dummy variable, SAS output. 
This table summarizes the separate SAS outputs for dependent variables 
Unemployment and Unemployment % Change, respectively. Both are measured as a 
function of number of frauds with a consumer sentiment dummy variable for 128 and 
127 degrees of freedom, respectively. See Appendices H and I for full SAS reports.  
Consumer sentiment did not produce a t-value that would suggest that it is a statistically 
significant predictor of unemployment or percent change in unemployment. However, 
in the specification with unemployment as the dependent variable, it appears that 
unemployment tends to be lower when frauds were revealed during periods of bad 
sentiment.  
Size of Fraud 
The magnitude of fraud was determined by the loss in market capitalization 
from before versus after the fraud was discovered. Any fraud with lost market 
capitalization above the median was determined a “big” fraud. The count of these big 
frauds per quarter was added as a variable into the regression equation to try to achieve 
a model with a better fit to describe the data.   
Table 8     
 $ Change GDPt  % Change GDPt  
 Estimate t Stat. Estimate t Stat. 
 20 
 
Count of Fraudst-1 -3.3248515 -2.46 -0.0001357 -0.71 
Count of Big Fraudst-1 8.3004449 3.38 .0000561 0.18 
$ Change GDPt-1 0.4936099 6.01        -     - 
% Change GDPt-1 -      -  0.12060763 4.27 
Adj. R2 .3004 - .253  
N 128 - 128 - 
Table 8: Cross-sectional analysis of GDP and GDP growth as a function of count of 
frauds and count of big frauds, SAS output. 
This table summarizes the separate SAS outputs for dependent variables $ Change GDP 
and % Change GDP, respectively. Both are measured as a function of number of frauds 
and number of big frauds for 127 degrees of freedom. See Appendices J and K for full 
SAS reports.  
This data produced counterintuitive results. While the count of frauds showed a 
statistically significant negative correlation with the dollar change in GDP, the count of 
big frauds was a statistically significant positive predictor for this variable. Using 
percent change in GDP as the dependent variable yielded an equally perplexing output. 
In this case, the count of frauds in a quarter was shown to be a statistically significant 
positive predictor for future GDP. These results prompted an additional question for my 
research: why would big frauds have a positive effect on GDP, or what other factors 
could be at play to misconstrue the data? I explore this question further in the 
Correlations portion later in this paper. 
I applied these same measures of market capitalization to unemployment and 
change in unemployment. Neither were correlated to a statistically significant degree to 
the occurrence of big fraud. 
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Table 9     
 Unemploymentt  % 
Change 
Unemploymentt 
 Estimate t Stat. Estimate t Stat. 
Count of Fraudst-1 -0.0175874 -2.25 -
0.0003129 
-0.34 
Count of Big Fraudst-1 0.0291851 1.86 0.0011069 0.6 
Unemploymentt-1 0.9816293 42.74        -        - 
% Change 
Unemploymentt-1 
           -      -  0.6071031 7.63 
Adj. R2 0.9613 -  0.3924 - 
N 129 - 128 -  
Table 9: Cross-sectional analysis of unemployment and change in unemployment as a 
function of count of frauds and count of big frauds, SAS output. 
This table summarizes the separate SAS outputs for dependent variables 
Unemployment and Unemployment % Change, respectively. Both are measured as a 
function of number of frauds and number of big frauds for 128 and 127 degrees of 
freedom, respectively. See Appendices L and M for full SAS reports.  
Big Frauds Exclusively 
As a final auxiliary assessment, I analyzed a simple regression between only the 
count of instances of big fraud and GDP.  
Table 10     
 $ Change GDPt  % Change GDPt  
 Estimate t Stat. Estimate t Stat. 
Count of Big Fraudst-1  3.4484821 1.88 -0.000144 -0.73 
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$ Change GDPt-1 0.4967164 6.35        -     - 
% Change GDPt-1           -     -  0.5070854 4.4 
Adj. R2 0.2831 - 0.2561 -  
N 128 - 128 - 
Table 10: GDP and GDP growth as a function of count of big frauds, SAS output 
This table summarizes the SAS output for $ Change GDP and % Change GDP for 127 
degrees of freedom. See Appendices N and O for full SAS reports. 
Number of big frauds in a given quarter did not prove a statistically significant predictor 
of GDP or GDP growth. 
I also computed a simple linear regression with unemployment and change in 
unemployment as a function of the count of big fraud in a quarter. 
Table 11     
 Unemploymentt  % Change Unemploymentt 
 Estimate t Stat. Estimate t Stat. 
Count of Big Fraudst-1 0.00520981 .39 0.0006464 .45 
Unemploymentt-1 .98803744 42.19        -        - 
% Change 
Unemploymentt-1 
           -      -  0.6100135 7.71 
Adj. R2 .9605 - .3967 - 
N 129 - 128 - 
Table 11: Unemployment and change in unemployment as a function of count of big 
frauds, SAS output 
This table summarizes the SAS output for Unemployment and Unemployment % 
Change for 127 degrees of freedom. See Appendices P and Q for full SAS reports.  
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Based on the above analysis, count of big frauds is not a statistically significant 
predictor of unemployment or change in unemployment. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 The fallout from the Great Recession in the United States has not been forgotten, 
even more than 10 years after the downturn began. While the financial and economic 
implications became apparent early on, research on the effects on individual American 
households has been trickling out in the years following. The Great Recession impacted 
far more than financial health; impacts reached into psychological and physical health 
detriments as well (Yilmazer, et al. 2015). Arguably the most alarming factor in this 
recession was the inaccuracy of business economists in predicting it. Most business 
economists produced pessimistic predictions for conditions in the year 2007, but very 
few if any predicted a recession of such devastating scope (Lundquist and Stekler 
2012). If even our most seasoned economic specialists cannot predict a recession, how 
can the average citizen even begin to prepare for a downturn?  
 In preparing this work, I compiled literary and statistical works in order to 
address the dilemma above. Inherently, there are significant limitations to characterizing 
the economy of a nation using single numerical variables. However, the void in the 
research on this particular topic and the potential applicability across disciplines more 
than warranted its exploration. It is important to note, however, the limitations 
associated with this variety of research and my experimental design in particular.  
First, as the data used in this study comes from the US, any conclusions drawn 
from this study may not necessarily generalize to other countries. While this hypothesis 
may be explored in other nations through future research, this is outside the scope of 
what I aimed to accomplish for my thesis project. Second, using a quarterly period 
means that I was only able to test 130 data points in coming to my conclusions. While 
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this ensured that there was a sufficient time frame for differences to be detected 
between the two variables, it also meant that the bar for statistical significance would be 
much higher than in a larger sample. Even if there is an underlying relationship between 
these variables, it is possible that the model used was not be able to detect it. 
 Lastly, as discussed earlier, it can be difficult to ascertain with absolute 
confidence that the detection of financial reporting misconduct is the factor driving any 
changes in economic conditions. While I mitigated this by incorporating lagged 
versions of my dependent variables as controls, it is unlikely that I will be able to rule 
out all other factors as independent variables. This problem is inherent with researching 
something as broad and intricate as the economy of a nation, but I still firmly believe 
that any research that can help explain what factors play a role in downturns can be 
useful to consumers, economists, and future researchers.  
 This model presents a worthwhile pursuit for future research as it has the 
potential to provide a powerful tool to the arsenal of business economists. More 
expansive research and data collection techniques could yield results that better reflect 
the actual relationship, if any exists, between financial reporting misconduct and 
macroeconomic conditions. As government agencies become more adept at detecting 
corporate accounting fraud, future analysis may be better able to compile this 
information and provide greater insight into the nature of its effect on the economy. 
Though there is always a potential for discovery of a possible downturn to spiral into a 
self-fulfilling prophecy of a recession, if handled properly this information could be 
provided to government agents ahead of the peak so that they might take proactive 
measures to mitigate the effects of a downturn. 
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 What’s more, substantial interest in this issue could have indirect implications 
for financial statement consumers as well. Widely publicizing the relationship between 
fraud and economic conditions may encourage users to check financial statements more 
intensely, inadvertently creating a checking system on firms without any government 
expenditure. This could potentially decrease instances of corporate fraud overall and 
would help keep firms accountable for their responsibility to provide accurate 
information to consumers.  
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